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The Presumption of Life: A Starting
Point for a Due Process Analysis of
Capital Sentencing
As early as 1354, English law recognized that the sovereign could not
put an individual to death without providing that individual with due pro-
cess of law.' While the drafters of our Bill of Rights subsequently incor-
porated the principle of due process into American law, and our legal
system still invokes it as a constitutional safeguard, American courts are
currently sentencing capital defendants to death without according them
this protection. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to pro-
vide some procedural safeguards to these defendants through the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, and has invoked
specific guarantees of due process in a few cases, but this effort is inade-
quate in practice and misguided in theory.
In 1976, less than five years after invalidating all capital punishment
statutes in the nation,' the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia, Florida,
and Texas statutes against Eighth Amendment challenges.3 Since then,
the Court has relied extensively upon the procedures contained in those
three state statutes to determine the constitutionally required elements of
capital sentencing proceedings.4 A significant body of Eighth Amendment
1. The law provided that: "[N]o Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of
Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due process of the law." 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (1354), quoted in F. THOMPSON,
MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CoNSTITTION 1300-1629, at 92 &
n.72 (1948).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
4. The three state statutory schemes have taken on more than precedential weight. The Court's
recent refusal to hold that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality review in capital sentenc-
ing systems was based in part on the lack of such a procedure in the Texas system upheld inJurek.
Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). The Court reasoned that it could not require that the Cali-
fornia system include the procedure without overruling Jurek. Id. at 879. The Court so held even
though the Georgia statute and the Florida system, upheld under the Eighth Amendment at the same
time asJurek, provided for such a review. Id. at 876. The majority reasoned that the Georgia and
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analysis has developed around the 1976 cases,5 but the Court has not rec-
ognized any core values from which minimal standards of procedural pro-
tection can evolve.6
The Court has not adequately analyzed the impact of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on capital sentencing systems. Be-
cause of its text and history, the due process clause provides better author-
ity for establishing the minimal procedures that should underlie all capital
sentencing proceedings than does the Eighth Amendment. By refusing to
rely upon the due process clause, the Court has permitted states to develop
capital sentencing schemes that disregard the fundamental values of our
system of criminal procedure.
This Note asserts that the starting point for a due process analysis of a
capital sentencing system should be a presumption of life,' analogous to
Florida opinions "were focused not on proportionality review as such, but only on the provision of
some sort of prompt and automatic appellate review." Id. at 879.
In Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), the Court relied upon Gregg in upholding a Georgia
death sentence imposed by a jury that had been instructed to consider an aggravating circumstance
subsequently found to be unconstitutionally vague. In rejecting Stephens' argument that the jury had
been given too much discretion, the Court reasoned that the "argument could not be accepted without
overruling our specific holding in Gregg." Id. at 2742. Although Gregg did not address the issue of
unlawful jury instructions, the Court asserted that Gregg and Jurek had made it "clear that specific
standards for balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally re-
quired." Id. at 2742 n.13. Ironically, the Court itself had found it necessary in Stephens to certify a
question to the Georgia Supreme Court to clarify the state's capital sentencing law. See Zant v. Ste-
phens, 456 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1982) (per curiam).
The Court also relied on Jurek to approve the use of testimony on the future dangerousness of a
defendant by psychiatrists who had never examined the defendant. "At bottom, to agree with peti-
tioner's basic position would seriously undermine and in effect overruleJurek v. Texas." Barefoot v.
Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3400 (1983). Yet theJurek Court had not examined the issue of psychiatric
testimony. The Supreme Court's review of the evidence presented at Jurek's trial did not mention any
such evidence. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 266-67 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). The
Court's analysis focused on laypersons' predictions of future dangerousness. Id. at 275-76.
5. The major procedural requirements of the Eighth Amendment in capital sentencing are "an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of
the crime," Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2744 (1983) (emphasis in original), and some type of
automatic appellate review, Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984).
6. In the same case where the Court relied on Jurek to uphold the California capital sentencing
system, it restated the Gregg Court's position that "'[we do not intend to suggest that only the above-
described procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed
along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system
must be examined on an individual basis."' Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876 (1984) (quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (footnote omitted)); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3165 (1984)
(Court "unwilling to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital-sentencing
scheme"). Although states may enact various statutory procedures that should be examined individu-
ally for Eighth Amendment violations, this Note argues that courts must also evaluate these proce-
dures against a basic constitutional due process standard, just as they evaluate traditional criminal
trial procedures. See infra note 13.
7. The use'of the term "presumption of life" in this Note should be distinguished from its use by
courts in other contexts. Historically, the term has been used by federal and state courts in disappear-
ance cases "where the issue is upon the life or death of a person, once shown to have been living, the
burden of proof lies upon the party, who asserts the death. But after the lapse of seven years, without
intelligence concerning the person, the presumption of life ceases, and the burden of proof is devolved
on the other party." 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 41, at 47 (Boston
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the presumption of innocence that orders our criminal trials. The pre-
sumption of life guarantees a convicted defendant the right to live incar-
cerated for life unless the prosecution demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that death is the only appropriate penalty for the defendant. The
Note establishes that a constitutional mandate8 of a presumption of life
arises from the same source and rationale that support the constitutionally
required presumption of innocence. The Note then analyzes some of the
procedural consequences of a presumption of life, focusing especially on
the function of the bifurcated trial proceeding. Finally, the Note identifies
the method of burden allocation and some of the mechanisms for judicial
review inherent in a sentencing system built on this foundation.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
Despite the Supreme Court's repeated reliance9 on its 1976 opinions,
the Court nevertheless has modified its Eighth Amendment assessments of
1842) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); accord Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956,
961 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (where time of death uncertain, there is presumption of continuance of life).
The Wisconsin courts have approved a jury instruction on the presumption of life during abortion
prosecutions and have asserted that there is a "presumption that life from conception continue[s]."
State v. Gresens, 40 Wis. 2d 179, 184-85, 161 N.W.2d 245, 248 (1968) (relying on I F. WHARTON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 115 (12th ed. 1955)).
Only one court appears to have mentioned a presumption of life in a capital punishment context.
While holding that the presumption of innocence had no direct application to the capital sentencing
determination, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the heavier burdens placed on the prose-
cution in a capital sentencing proceeding and "acknowledged that in some sense there is a 'presump-
tion of life"' implicit in the proceeding. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288, 300
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3547 (1984). Without further analysis the court held that a comment
during the sentencing phase by the prosecution on the lack of remorse of the defendant was properly
allowed by the trial judge. 467 A.2d at 301.
8. The notion that the criminal law should favor the preservation of the capital defendant's life
rather than the execution of the individual is not, of course, a new concept. The common law has long
recognized that in capital cases "there is, infavorein vitae," certain extra safeguards allowed to the
accused. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353, quoted in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
212 n.9 (1965) (explaining origin of peremptory challenge); see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "to fashion a policy infavorem vitae" as
majority opinion had done in foreclosing retrial of capital charges was barred by precedent); Rankin
v. Tennessee, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 380, 381-82 (1871) ("It is a rule in criminal law infavoren vitae,
in capital cases, that when a special plea in bar is found against the prisoner. . . [he] may plead over
to the felony the general issue, not guilty."); Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 697 (1941) (presuming in favorem vitae that individual condemned to death
consented to new trial, since he had never expressed desire to be executed). The South Carolina
Supreme Court has employed the doctrine most often and most consistently in capital cases as a
standard of appellate review. E.g., State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 320, 295 S.E.2d 264, 264-65
(1982) ("On appeal from a murder conviction in which the death penalty is imposed, this court
reviews the entire record for prejudicial error infavoremn vitae, regardless of whether the error was
properly preserved for review."); see McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The End of
an Era, 24 S.C.L. REv. 762, 774-80 (1972) (tracing history of use of principle by South Carolina
Supreme Court and its impact on reversals of capital convictions).
9. See supra note 4.
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those state statutes." There purportedly has emerged a "procedural due
process strain in eighth amendment analysis."1 The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that in capital cases "the sentencing process, as well as the
trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause,"
' 2
but has not attempted to articulate the core values" of capital sentencing
due process.
A. Fundamental Procedural Fairness
The few capital cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on the
due process clause give little guidance on the extent to which due process
applies to capital sentencing. Most of the Court's opinions concerning
capital sentencing that mention the Fourteenth Amendment have not re-
ferred specifically to the due process clause, citing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment only as the provision through which the Eighth Amendment applies
to the states.1 4 In three cases, however, the Court has explicitly invoked
the due process clause to invalidate a practice in a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding. In Gardner v. Florida,5 the Court vacated the death sentence,
imposed by a judge over a jury recommendation of life imprisonment, be-
cause the judge had relied in part on a presentence investigation report
that was not disclosed to the defendant. The Court held that the nondis-
closure of the report violated the requirements of due process since the
state did not have sufficient justification for withholding the report.1" The
Court supported the due process reasoning by observing that defendants
10. For example, although the Georgia statute was upheld on its face in Gregg, two specific
features of the statute have since been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (plurality opinion) (setting aside death sentence based on aggra-
vating factor interpreted so broadly by Georgia courts that it was unconstitutional although challenge
to same factor had been specifically rejected by Gregg Court, 428 U.S. at 201); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (vacating death sentence imposed under Georgia statute on
defendant convicted of rape of adult woman because death was disproportionate punishment for of-
fense and therefore violated Eighth Amendment); see also Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-42, 224
S.E.2d 386, 391 (1976) (Georgia Supreme Court declaring unconstitutionally vague the aggravating
circumstance in Georgia statute of "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions").
11. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1980) (analyzing judicial review of process as cruel).
12. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion).
13. The Court has recognized core due process values of criminal trials. See, e.g., Estelle v. Wil-
liams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (presumption of innocence underlies our criminal justice system); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (because citizens must have confidence in our criminal justice
system, prosecution must establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict an individual).
14. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 423 (1980) (plurality opinion) (declaring provi-
sion of Georgia capital punishment statute violated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599, 604-05 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (holding that Ohio death penalty
statute that precluded consideration of relevant mitigating factors violated Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
15. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 361-62.
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have a right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing 7 and that
defendants have a legitimate interest in the character of the sentencing
procedure.' Although the Court expressly stated that the mere applica-
tion of due process does not "implicate the entire panoply of criminal trial
procedural rights," and that "'[o]nce it is determined that due process ap-
plies, the question remains what process is due,"' 9 the Gardner Court
did not address the critical question of the exact extent of due process
protections. Subsequent actions by the Supreme Court show that Gard-
ner's due process rationale has had little enduring influence.
2 0
The following year, the Court issued a per curiam opinion in Presnell
v. Georgia,2" declaring that a death sentence that was based on an under-
lying rape charge of which the defendant was not properly convicted vio-
lated the fundamental principles of procedural fairness, and therefore was
unconstitutional under the due process clause. 2 The next year, in Green
v. Georgia,23 the Court held, in another per curiam opinion, that the ex-
clusion of hearsay evidence offered in mitigation denied the defendant due
process, but noted that this due process violation arose under "unique
circumstances."
24
The absence of a majority opinion in these three cases indicates that the
Court has failed not only to articulate due process guidelines, but has
failed even to agree that due process applies in capital sentencing.26 Indi-
vidual Justices28 and commentators, however, continue to assert that a de-
17. Id. at 358 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967)).
18. Id. (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968)).
19. Id. at 358 n.9 (quoting in part, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
20. Compare, for example, the Court's subsequent refusal to hear capital defendants' claims that
ex parte nonrecord sentencing data relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court must be disclosed.
Brown v. Wainwright, 454 U.S. 1000, 1001 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see also Alford v. Florida, 436 U.S. 935, 939 (1978) (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (nonrecord information about defendant commu-
nicated ex parte by probation supervisor to trial judge but not revealed to defendant).
21. 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (per curiam).
22. Id. at 15-17.
23. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 97 (hearsay evidence concerned co-defendant's confession to the murder with which
Green was charged).
25. Justice White expressly rejected the Court's application of the due process clause to sentencing
in Gardner and concurred on Eighth Amendment grounds. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364
(1977) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
26. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3410 n.6 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found that the "mislead-
ing nature of any psychiatric prediction of future violence violates due process when introduced in a
capital sentencing hearing . . . ." The majority opinion rejected the due process challenge without
analysis. Id. at 3400. In an even more recent case, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, quoted the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and discussed the appli-
cability of due process of law to the deprivation of life as requiring unique safequards. Spaziano v.
Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3167 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens ultimately reasoned that the procedural right to a trial by jury before deprivation of liberty
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fendant does have a right to due process of law in a capital sentencing
proceeding and that state sentencing procedures frequently violate this
right.1
7
B. Specific Procedural Protections
While the Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply due process with
full force to capital sentencing, it has applied certain specific procedural
protections. When faced with arguments that courts should require partic-
ular procedural safeguards in capital sentencing proceedings, the Court
inevitably2 asserts that a capital sentencing proceeding resembles a trial
in some respects, but not in all, and therefore some but not all of the
procedural protections apply.29 Through this method of analysis, the
Court has determined that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment applies to the penalty phases of capital trials in Arizona"0 and Mis-
souri."1 It has also held that the provisions against self-incrimination of
the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel apply in capital sentencing proceedings in Texas.32
Recently, however, a majority of the Supreme Court joined an opinion
characterizing the nature of a life/death decision at the penalty phase of a
capital trial as fundamentally different from a guilt/innocence decision,33
because there was no central issue in the penalty phase3 4 on which the
jury's attention was focused. This reasoning, however, cannot properly ex-
tend to all state statutory schemes. The supporting analysis referred to
California's procedures, which do not place a burden on the prosecution
should be applied in capital sentencing proceedings before deprivation of life. Id. at 3175. The major-
ity of the Court apparently rejected the due process challenge, although the reasoning in its opinion
addressed only the Sixth Amendment challenge. Id. at 3161-65.
27. See generally Weissman, Sentencing Due Process: Evolving Constitutional Principles, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 530 (1982) (death penalty is sui generis and "[s]trict judicial scrutiny
coupled with enhanced due process standards is therefore mandated to insure constitutional protec-
tion"); Note, The Death Penalty Cases: Shaping Substantive Criminal Law, 58 IND. L.J. 187,
204-06 (1982) (concept of procedural due process requires that defendant have right to jury at capital
sentencing proceeding).
28. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3161-62 (1984) (although "[p]etitioner does
not urge that capital sentencing is so much like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by"
Supreme Court precedent guaranteeing right to jury trial, Court discusses argument for analogy any-
way). But see Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 347-58 (analyzing perceived
breakdown in use of "trial metaphor" in capital sentencing cases reflected in Supreme Court opinions
of 1982 Term).
29. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3162-65 (1984).
30. Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2310 (1984).
31. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
32. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63, 471 (1981).
33. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3456 (1983).
34. But compare id. with Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2310 (1984). In the latter opinion,
Justice O'Connor, who also wrote the Ramos opinion, reasoned that the defendant's initial life sen-
tence "was undoubtedly an acquittal on the merits of the central issue in the proceeding-whether
death was the appropriate punishment . . . ." (emphasis added).
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to persuade the sentencing authority of the appropriateness of sentencing
the defendant to death,35 as some states do,36 and as all state statutes
should.3 7 The Court has yet to analyze the nature of the capital sentenc-
ing decision free from the constraints of a particular state's statutory
framework. This Note argues that such an analysis supports the adoption
of procedural devices that place the burden of persuasion on the prosecu-
tion in capital sentencing.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL POINT OF DEPARTURE:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIFE
The due process clauses oblige the judiciary to apply specific federal
constitutional guarantees in criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court
must develop a method of analyzing capital sentencing proceedings to as-
sess whether they comport with a constitutional standard. The Court
should follow its experience in developing the rest of its criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence and focus first on the core due process values of capital
sentencing, and only then determine the procedural implications of those
values.
A. The Constitutional Necessity of the Presumption of Innocence
The Burger Court has held that the presumption of inno-
cence is "a basic component of a fair trial"38 and that impairment of
the presumption violates the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 This holding
reaffirmed an earlier Court's observation that the presumption is
"the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."40
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984) ("trier of fact ... shall impose a sentence of
death if ... aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances"); see Note, Capital
Punishment and the Burden of Proof. The Sentencing Decision, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 316, 316-17
(1981).
36. See infra notes 105 and 106.
37. See infra note 104.
38. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
39. Id. at 503-06 (state cannot compel defendant to appear at trial in prison clothes because of
possible impairment of presumption of innocence).
The Court has held that a jury instruction containing the precise expression "presumption of inno-
cence" is a constitutional requirement in criminal trials unless, in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, the overall fairness of the trial ensures that the accused is not being deprived of due process of
law. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (per curiam). Some Justices have asserted that
"an instruction on the presumption of innocence is constitutionally required in every case where a
timely request has been made." Id. at 791 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing). A trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence can result in reversal
of a conviction. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978).
40. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). For the classic treatment of the history of
the presumption of innocence, see J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 551-76 (1898). See generally Fox, The "Presumption of Innocence" as Constitutional
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Continental 1 and Socialiste legal systems, as well as international resolu-
tions,"3 also include the presumption of innocence as a fundamental ele-
ment of criminal procedure.
The presumption of innocence in American criminal procedure derives
from our common-law heritage, the text of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and considerations of policy. American courts have traced
the existence of the presumption of innocence as far back as Deuteronomy
and Roman law.4 In the mid-seventeenth century, the legislature of colo-
nial Massachusetts employed the presumption as a burden-allocation de-
vice in criminal trials.45 The presumption has always been closely associ-
ated with the requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt,46 but is also considered to be an independent element of
due process in criminal trials.47
The text of the Fifth Amendment 48 protects an individual from crimi-
nal sanctions unless the government is able to obtain an indictment, pre-
vail before the factfinder at the original trial, convict the individual with-
out his or her own testimony, and accord the person due process of law.
The requirement that the state accord individuals due process of law
before depriving them of life, liberty, or property was subsequently in-
cluded in the Fourteenth Amendment's directive to the states.49 When the
Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791, the presumption of innocence was
already part of our common law."0 When the Fourteenth Amendment was
Doctrine, 28 OATH. U.L. REV. 253 (1979) (discussing constitutional status of presumption and criti-
cizing Court's holding in Taylor v. Kentucky for failure to provide precise language of jury instruction
and failure to assess actual impact of instructions).
41. Both the French and the German systems of criminal law recognize the presumption of inno-
cence. See Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Prac-
tices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 880-81 & nn. 3-5 (1968).
42. The presumption of innocence figures prominently in the legal doctrine of the U.S.S.R. See
Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Union, 15 UCLA L. Rzv. 1203, 1205 (1968).
43. See Fletcher, supra note 41, at 880 n.1.
44. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-55 (1895).
45. See J. THAYER, supra note 40, at 552-54 (according to RECORDS OF MASSACHUSEXrs, pre-
sumption in favor of accused, operating in both civil and criminal trials, required plaintiff to prove
case by sufficient evidence).
46. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12 (1978) (tracing history of relationship be-
tween presumption of innocence and reasonable-doubt standard).
47. Id. at 490.
48.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
... nor ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. .
U.S. CONsT. amend V.
49. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. "[T]here can be no doubt that, if the principle [of the presumption of innocence] had not
found formal expression in the common law writers at an earlier date [than 1802], yet the practice
Capital Sentencing
ratified in 1868, the presumption was firmly established as a principle of
due process.5
Modern courts accept the presumption of innocence as a core compo-
nent of criminal due process52 because it invokes at least three features of
procedural fairness. First, the presumption ensures that the state's arrest,
indictment, and arraignment of the accused are not considered evidence of
guilt,5" and that the accused is judged only upon evidence and arguments
presented at trial."' This "'purging' effect" 55 of the presumption allows
the defendant to start with a clean slate at trial, and is one of several
procedures that help strip the state of its cloak of authority.56 Second, the
presumption assigns to the prosecution the burden of producing evidence
of the elements of the crime.57 Finally, the presumption places on the
prosecution the burden of persuading the jury58 that a verdict of guilty is
legally justified. 59 The presumption that the prosecution must overcome is
one of legal innocence, rather than factual innocence.60 The accused re-
mains free from any criminal sanction until the jury is convinced that the
individual is not only factually guilty, but also morally culpable.61 Soci-
which flowed from it has existed in the common law from the earliest time." Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 455 (1895).
51. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 7, § 34, at 39 (published in 1842) ("the law presumes every
man innocent") (emphasis in original); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-56 (1895)
(tracing historical development of presumption of innocence).
52. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04
(1976).
53. United States v. Thaxton, 483 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing functions of pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal procedure).
54. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
55. Id. at 486.
56. See A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1153 (1960) (discussing development of procedural safeguards to offset state's
advantages in resources and authority in criminal proceedings).
57. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978).
58. If the defendant has waived the right to a jury, the prosecution must, of course, persuade the
trial judge of the appropriateness of convicting the defendant.
59. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978). Traditionally in criminal cases there are
two aspects of the burden of proof-the burden of production of evidence and the burden of persua-
sion. The burden of production is the burden of going forward with the evidence and presenting
evidence that the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it. If the prosecution does not meet
this burden, the defendant can move for a directed verdict of acquittal. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 44 (1972). The burden of persuasion is the burden of con-
vincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of the crime are present including
that the defendant is legally accountable. Both burdens must be met to obtain a conviction. Id.
60. See J. THAYER, supra note 40, at 552 (presumption in favor of defendant "is not founded on
any notion that defendants generally are free from blame"). Modern commentators also suggest that
persons charged with crimes are more often convicted than acquitted. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 59, § 8, at 53.
61. To characterize the determination of criminal guilt as a purely factual finding ignores an
essential ingredient of that decisionmaking process. Criminal trial jurors not only must decide whether
they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact the defendant did commit the alleged act,
but also must consider nonfactual elements, such as recklessness, or justifications and excuses that
involve normative judgments. The ultimate conviction must be based on a finding of moral culpability
359
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ety's belief in the integrity of citizens must be upheld by presuming that
an individual is legally innocent until the prosecution persuades the deci-
sionmaker that the defendant's "violation of a proscription of the criminal
law renders him [or her] properly subject to moral censure."62
B. The Presumption of Life as an Indispensable Feature of Capital
Sentencing
The same dictates of text and policy that ensure that a criminal defend-
ant may be deprived of his or her liberty only after the prosecution has
overcome the presumption of innocence at trial apply with equal, if not
greater, force to require that the prosecution overcome the presumption of
life in a capital sentencing proceeding before a defendant can be put to
death.
1. From an Eighth Amendment Analysis to a Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisprudence
If a lawyer unfamiliar with the history of capital punishment in this
country were handed a copy of the Constitution and asked to determine
what protections a capital defendant could claim, he or she would likely
focus on the provisions in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the only
references63 to the taking of a person's life in the Constitution. 4 The in-
clusion of "life" as well as "liberty" and "property" in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments suggests that the drafters
viewed the state's depriving an individual of life as distinct from depriva-
tions of liberty and property.65 The Court has considered the deprivation
and not simply on the occurrence of an act. Otherwise, the stigma of the criminal sanction that distin-
guishes it from civil liability would not be warranted. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of
Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185,
197-98 (1983); cf. Fletcher, supra note 41, at 888-92 (asserting that state can only justify punishing
persons who are morally culpable and that appearance of strict liability standards in criminal law is
aberrational).
62. Fletcher, supra note 41, at 889 (footnote omitted).
63. See supra notes 48 and 49 (quoting text of relevant provisions).
64. Some have relied on the references to capital punishment in the Constitution to defend the use
of the death penalty in modern American society. One of the most notable proponents of this position
was Justice Black. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 225-26 (1971) (opinion of Black, J.).
This Note does not adopt this position nor does it address the issue of the constitutionality of the death
penalty. This Note limits its analysis to the threshold procedural protections constitutionally required
in capital sentencing schemes, and assumes, arguendo, that according to the rationales in Gregg, capi-
tal punishment is not per se unconstitutional. For a persuasive argument that the inherent inaccura-
cies of the criminal justice system make it inappropriate ever to impose the irrevocable sentence of
death, see C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d
ed. augmented 1981); see also Bruck, Decisions of Death: The Lottery of Capital Punishment is
Rigged by Race, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18 (describing recent studies indicating
racially discriminatory impact of capital sentencing systems).
65. Justice Brennan has noted, in the course of discussing the constitutional references to capital
punishment, that we can infer that the framers of the procedural protection clause of the Fifth
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of life as an interest independent of liberty or property in several con-
texts.'6 Clearly, the execution of an individual falls within the concept of
a deprivation of life by the state.67
The failure of capital punishment jurisprudence to focus on the due
process clauses, and to rely instead upon the Eighth Amendment, is
largely a result of the sequence in which particular cases reached the Su-
preme Court. The landmark cases of McGautha v. California,6" Furman
v. Georgia,69 and Gregg v. Georgia"0 were decided within a span of five
years. Only thirteen months after a five-Justice majority in McGautha7
1
rejected the argument that capital punishment procedures in California
and Ohio violated the due process clause, the Court issued a per curiam
judgment in Furman declaring that the death penalty procedures in
Texas and Georgia were unconstitutional. Each of the nine Justices
Amendment recognized that it applied to persons charged with crimes punishable by death. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. An early Fourteenth Amendment case stated that "the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of consti-
tutional law . . . ." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). The Court also asserted that
"the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material
right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable irn any
country where freedom prevails .... " Id. Recently, life has been regarded under the equal protec-
tion clause as an independent fundamental value. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of woman
to have abortion balanced against right of unborn fetus). Recognizing the strong value placed on life,
the Court determined that the viability of the fetus, that is the point at which the fetus is capable of
living outside the mother's womb, was the critical issue distinguishing when the state can proscribe an
abortion from when it cannot. Id. at 163; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3167 (1984)
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
concept of due process permits no. . .deprivation-whether of life, liberty or property-to occur if it
is grossly excessive. . . ."); Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1983),
probable jurisdiction noted in part and cert. granted in part, 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984) (Nos. 83-1035
and 83-1070, cases consolidated) (striking down Tennessee's "fleeing felon" statute that permitted
police officers to shoot escaping suspects as violative of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because it
deprived persons of their fundamental right to life without due process of law and because there was
no compelling state interest where felon did not threaten public safety). But see Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring in result) ("Constitution makes no distinction
between capital and noncapital cases" because question of whether deprivation of liberty is less oner-
ous than deprivation of life is value judgment.). Justice Clark's observation, however, was made in
support of the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a procedure in criminal
trials that it condemns in capital cases. This assertion does not suggest that courts should not adhere
in capital cases to procedures that are observed in criminal trials, such as those emanating from the
presumption of innocence.
67. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972), the Court em-
phasized that the "range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite" and that
prior to weighing the interests of the individual against those of the state, it must be established that
the individual's interests are encompassed by the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
there may be a question whether a person's life is at issue in abortion and euthanasia cases, there is
no question that a capital defendant has a life interest at stake.
68. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
69. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
71. Justice Black concurred in a separate opinion. See supra note 64.
72. Death sentences imposed under the Georgia statute and the Texas statute were unconstitu-
tional because they constituted "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
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filed a separate opinion in Furman. Although some of the Justices dis-
cussed the due process clause, the common ground on which the opinions
necessary to support the judgment rested was the Eighth Amendment.
73
As a result of Furman, capital punishment statutes in thirty-nine states
and the District of Columbia were invalidated, as well as several federal
statutory provisions."' Subsequently, the Supreme Court invalidated the
death sentences in 118 capital cases from twenty-six states.7 5
Four years later, after more than thirty states had drafted new capital
punishment statutes, the Court was presented with arguments that the
new sentencing procedures in five states were unconstitutional. The Jus-
tices looked at the sentencing systems to see if they resolved the concerns
addressed in Furman. Because the Furman concerns derived from the
Eighth Amendment, the Court's judgment that three of the systems were
constitutionally adequate" rested on the rationale that the three com-
ported with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment."
Although the discussion above78 illustrates that what due process analy-
sis there is in capital sentencing carries little weight, members of the
Court have continually recognized that the task they perform in capital
cases is largely a procedural review. 9 The Court should therefore ac-
knowledge that adopting merely a few due process protections is inade-
quate in capital sentencing, where all of the key elements of due process
teenth Amendments." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 240.
73. Chief Justice Burger criticized the approach taken in the concurring opinions of Justices
White and Stewart and argued that it was "essentially and exclusively a procedural due process
argument," disguised as an Eighth Amendment adjudication to avoid the McGautha precedent. Id. at
399-400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell agreed with the Chief Justice's criticism, id. at 427
n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting), but also asserted that the tests for applying the due process clause and
the cruel and unusual punishments clause are "fundamentally identical." Id. at 422 n.4.
74. Id. at 411-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. McDonald, supra note 8, at 762-63.
76. See supra note 3.
77. The Court struck down the mandatory capital statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana as
violative of the Eighth Amendment. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The due process clause was not discussed in depth by any of the Justices in any of the several
opinions issued in the three cases upholding the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes. The only refer-
ence to it was in a footnote discussion of McGautha. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195-96 n.47
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). Justice Rehnquist mentioned it briefly in his dissent in
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 324, as did Justice White in his Roberts dissent, 428 U.S. at 348, 350.
78. See supra pp. 354-56.
79. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451 (1983) ("In ensuring that the death penalty is not
meted out arbitrarily or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure
by which the State imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors" listed in state stat-
utes.) (emphasis in original); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3429 (1983) (Stevens, J., joined by
Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("A constant theme of our cases . . . has been emphasis on
procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the death penalty will be imposed in a consis-
tent, rational manner."); Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3417 n.15 (1983) (Blackmun, J., joined
by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court's focus in the death penalty cases has been
primarily in ensuring a fair procedure . . ").
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should apply in full force. In addition to complying with the ban on cruel
and unusual punishments,"' capital sentencing statutes must reflect the
fundamental due process notion that a convicted defendant is presumed to
have the right to live incarcerated for the rest of his or her life" unless the
prosecution persuades the sentencing authority that death is the singularly
appropriate punishment for the defendant."2
2. Rationales for the Presumption of Life
The rationales that support the presumption of innocence in criminal
trials"3 provide equal, if not greater, support for the presumption of life in
capital sentencing proceedings.8 ' The presumption of life is needed to off-
set the advantages enjoyed by the state at capital sentencing. There, the
state's cloak of authority is more manifest because the state has prevailed
in the guilt-determination phase of the capital trial. The state's adversary,
known throughout the trial as "the accused" or "the defendant," comes
before the sentencing authority stripped of his or her presumption of inno-
cence and labeled "the convicted." The presumption of life should ensure
80. The issue of whether the death penalty coniports with the evolving standards and moral com-
ponents of the Eighth Amendment is still debated, and this Note's analysis of the procedural values of
the due process clause is not intended to preclude a determination that the death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment. For challenging analyses of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the appropri-
ateness of capital punishment thereunder, see Berkman, Perspectives on the Death Penalty: Judicial
Behavior and the Eighth Amendment, I YALE L. & POL'y REv. 41 (1982) (arguing that proper focus
for Supreme Court in Eighth Amendment cases is on moral element of cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause); Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978) (advocating standard of judicial review under
Eighth Amendment that takes into account allocation of risk based on moral consensus).
81. Although arguments have been advanced that life imprisonment may be a harsher sanction
than death, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring in result), the
magnitude and multiplicity of the current efforts by the more than 1,400 individuals on death row to
have their death sentences vacated should give the proponent of such an argument pause. Only a few
individuals have failed to challenge their sentences of death. See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 889
n.5 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan was aware of four individuals who had not appealed
their death sentences on their own behalf and were executed since 1976.); Greenberg, Capital Punish-
ment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 913 (1982).
82. Much of the Eighth Amendment reasoning in Gregg and its progeny merges into the due
process analysis. The observation that the "'qualitative difference between death and other penalties
calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed,"' Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.
Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.))
reinforces the distinction between the deprivation of life in capital sentencing and the deprivation of
liberty in the guilt-determination phase of the trial, and strongly suggests that distinct procedural
safeguards are necessary. The requirement of individualized sentencing, Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct.
at 2743-44, highlights the similarity between the nature of the decision of guilt or innocence and the
decision of life imprisonment or the death penalty, both of which require that the decisionmaker take
into account the moral culpability of the defendant.
83. See supra pp. 359-60.
84. The capital sentencing process differs from most noncapital sentencing proceedings in its ad-
versarial format and in the limited number of choices presented to the decisionmaker. Therefore,
although the rationales may appear to apply to noncapital sentencing as well as to capital sentencing,
this Note is limited to the latter.
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that neither the fact that the crime with which the defendant was charged
was labeled "capital" nor the fact that the prosecution is seeking the death
penalty is considered evidence in support of a sentence of death.
The presumption of life is a necessary burden-allocation device that
clarifies the prosecution's obligation to produce evidence of aggravation
and to persuade the jury that the death penalty is appropriate for that
defendant. The capital sentencing decision, like the determination of guilt
and unlike the typical noncapital sentencing decision, is binary. Just as
the criminal trial jury must choose to convict or acquit, the capital sen-
tencing authority must choose to impose either life imprisonment or the
death penalty. In contrast, a noncapital sentencing authority can usually
strike a balance between the conflicting interests of the parties by adjust-
ing the length or severity of the noncapital sentence. When the evidence is
balanced equally between the two sides, the binary decisionmaker there-
fore needs an ordering principle that dictates which party prevails. In cap-
ital cases, the prosecution comes to the court seeking to end the defen-
dant's life; society's belief in the integrity of citizens demands that the
prosecution therefore bear the burden of justifying the imposition of the
death penalty on the defendant.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF LIFE
The impact of the presumption of innocence on criminal trial proceed-
ings has ranged from ensuring that defendants are not forced to appear
before the jury in identifiable prison clothing8" to mandating that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime.8"
The presumption of life makes comparable demands on capital sentencing
proceedings. It provides new support for bifurcating capital trials into a
penalty-determination phase and a guilt-determination phase. At a mini-
mum, courts should instruct juries on the purging effect of the presump-
tion of life and on the allocation of burdens during the penalty phase. In
addition, states should adopt statutory provisions that will ensure that
both the burdens of production and persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
are assigned to the prosecution during each phase of trial. Both trial and
appellate judges reviewing jury sentences should explicitly examine the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a death sentence.
85. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976).
86. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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A. The Purging Effect of the Bifurcated Trial
While not to be weighed as evidence in itself,87 the presumption of in-
nocence in criminal procedure, as explained above, ensures that the ac-
cused is judged solely on the evidence and arguments presented at trial.
The jurors do not observe the grand jury proceeding or probable cause
hearing, during which presentation of evidence not sufficiently reliable to
be introduced at trial is allowed,88 and the jury is usually instructed at
trial that "the defendant is presumed innocent, [and] that the mere fact of
accusation is no evidence of . . .guilt."8
In a like manner, a capital sentencing system based on a presumption
of life should prevent the determination of guilt from prejudicing the de-
termination of the appropriate penalty by bifurcating the penalty trial
from the guilt trial.9" The jury must be instructed that it cannot consider
as evidence the state's decision to seek the death penalty against that par-
ticular defendant. The jury must be charged that the defendant's convic-
tion of a capital crime creates a presumption that he or she will be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, and that life imprisonment is the appropriate
sentence, unless, during the penalty trial, the prosecution persuades them
that the only appropriate penalty for that defendant is death.
87. The Supreme Court termed the presumption of innocence to be evidence in Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895). After strong criticism the Court decided that the presumption was
not evidence per se, Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1897), but that it gave the defend-
ant a clean slate. See A. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1154 & n.11.
88. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 59, § 4, at 15-16 (outlining "step profile"
of criminal procedure where each new point of decision requires higher degree of reliability).
89. Id. § 8, at 53 (characterizing this language as statement customarily given to jury); see Taylor
v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487-90 & n.15 (1978) (recognizing that indictment is not to be weighed as
evidence, but declining to determine whether failure to give a jury instruction to that effect violated
the due process guarantee); see also A. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1156.
90. The noncapital sentencing procedure usually occurs in a nonadversarial setting after the jury
or judge has determined guilt, and the judge determines the length of sentence by relying upon ex
parte reports. In most capital cases, however, the judge presides over a second trial where the penalty
is determined. After a capital defendant is convicted at the guilt-determination phase of the trial, a
new hearing is held in which both sides may present evidence as to the appropriate sentence and
argue their positions before the sentencing authority. Under most statutes, the sentence imposed at this
point is binding, although some statutes, modeled after the Florida statute, allow trial judges to reject
sentences imposed by juries. See generally Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 102-19
(1980) (chart summarizing state capital punishment statutes). Another set of statutes, modeled after
the Texas statute, provides specific questions for the jury to answer after the second phase. The
responses to the questions determine whether the death sentence will be imposed. For a comprehen-
sive analysis of the Texas statute, see Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion
Cases, 26 CAT. U.L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1976), reprinted in C. BLAcK, supra note 64, at 114-25. See
generally A. LEFF, Leffs Legal Dictionary, 94 YALE L.J. (forthcoming) (1985) (bifurcated trial de-
fined as "split trial or other hearing" that "can save litigation effort" and "prevent the transfer of
irrelevant and prejudicial information between segments of the same case"); Comment, The Bifur-
cated Trial: Is It Used More Than It is Useful?, 31 EMORY L.J. 441, 441 (1982) (proponents of
bifurcation in determination of defendant's sanity in noncapital trials assert that: (1) it prevents deter-
mination of one issue from prejudicing another; (2) it simplifies necessary decisions; (3) it allows
defendant to put forth inconsistent positions in different proceedings).
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Bifurcation is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the capital punish-
ment statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976.91 It is a feature that
all states with capital punishment statutes have subsequently adopted.92
Although the bifurcated capital trial was not altogether new in 1976,"s the
Court stated in Gregg v. Georgia that it was one of the features of the
Georgia system that helped guide and channel the jury's discretion."' The
Court noted that the bifurcated trial also protects the integrity of the
guilt-determination phase; bifurcation allows the jury to decide the issue
of guilt before hearing evidence prejudicial to deciding that issue but help-
ful in choosing a sentence.9 5 The benefits of bifurcated trials stressed by
the Court in Gregg thus correspond to the requirement in the presump-
tion of life analysis that the decision of guilt not prejudice the choice of
sentence.
In light of recent decisions, it is uncertain whether the Court would
now consider a bifurcated proceeding a constitutionally essential aspect9 6
of the sentencing systems upheld in 1976. The Court has also never ex-
pressly overruled its 1971 holding in Crampton v. Ohio,97 where it re-
91. The Court specifically noted the bifurcation feature in each of the three sentencing schemes it
upheld. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 246 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, in the central Gregg opinion commented that "[a]s a general proposition these
concerns [in Furman] are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the
sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information." 428 U.S. at 195. Although these Justices expressly
stated that the procedures they described were not the only permissible ones, Justice White read the
opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, written by the same three Justices, as holding that a bifurcated
proceeding is constitutionally required in capital cases. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 356
(1976) (White, J., dissenting). The Court continues to rely on the central opinion's general proposi-
tion. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876-77 (1984).
92. See Gillers, supra note 90, at 102-19.
93. California, Connecticut, Georgia, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas had bifurcated capital
trials at the time of Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 208 & n.19 (1971) (decided with McGautha v.
California). For an early analysis of the use of the bifurcated trial in capital cases, see Note, The
Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 50 (1964).
94. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
JJ.).
95. Id. at 191-92.
96. The reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court in Harris may indicate that no one
particular procedure in the three sentencing systems upheld in 1976 is constitutionally essential. See
Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984), and discussion supra note 4. This interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment cases reinforces the need to look to the due process clause as the only meaningful
foundation for procedural safeguards in capital sentencing. Commentators have stopped short of di-
rectly arguing that bifurcation is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 28, at 309
(Crampton has "essentially been overruled," and state officials view Supreme Court as "virtually
requiring" bifurcation) (footnote omitted); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57,
103 n.38 (1978) (suggesting that Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), may establish constitutional
right to bifurcated proceeding).
97. 402 U.S. 183, 208-22 (1971) (decided with McGautha v. California) (rejecting defendant's
argument that unitary proceeding in capital case was unconstitutional because it forced defendant to
forgo either constitutional right to refuse to testify or constitutional right to have sentence imposed
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jected the argument that bifurcation is constitutionally compelled to ensure
that the defendant is not forced to choose between competing constitu-
tional rights.9  In a system based on the presumption of life, however, the
bifurcated trial is crucial to give that presumption practical effect.
B. Allocation of Burdens to the Prosecution
In criminal trials, the presumption of innocence allows the accused to
"'remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its bur-
den and produced evidence and effected persuasion.""" The presumption
requires that the prosecution convince the jury not merely that the evi-
dence of guilt exists and that it preponderates, but that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1"' Similarly, the presumption of life
should allow a defendant to remain inactive during the penalty phase un-
til the prosecution has produced evidence sufficient to reasonably support
a finding that a sentence of death is appropriate beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under most current capital sentencing systems, the prosecution
meets the burden of production of aggravating evidence to support a death
sentence during the guilt phase because the sentencing authority is permit-
ted to consider all evidence presented during both phases of the trial in its
choice of sentence.1"1 In its most recent examination of the Georgia sys-
only after opportunity to address sentencing authority and have all relevant evidence presented). Ap-
parently, two years earlier, the Court had voted six to three to declare that a bifurcated trial was
required. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSrRONG, THE BRETHREN 205-06 (1979). No opinion was ever
published, however, and the case was remanded on other grounds. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262
(1970) (per curiam). In McGautha, the Court also rejected the defendants' arguments that imposition
of the death penalty by a jury with absolute discretion was unconstitutional. 402 U.S. at 196-208.
98. The Court has acknowledged that in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Mc-
Gautha, decided with Crampton, must be read narrowly. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196 n.47
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 400
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[lit would be disingenuous to suggest that today's ruling has done any-
thing less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication."); id. at 427
n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("McGautha simply cannot be distinguished.").
Whether references to the limited scope of McGautha's authority were meant also to refer to
Crainpton is difficult to discern because of the combined decision in 1971. The footnote in Gregg
narrowing the precedential value of McGautha referred to McGautha as holding that the due process
clause did not require a bifurcated trial. There was no reference to Crampton, nor was there any
subsequent discussion of Furman's effect on whether bifurcation is constitutionally required. None of
the numerous opinions in the three 1976 cases upholding the bifurcated trial systems in Georgia,
Florida, and Texas even cited Crampton. Crampton's death sentence was vacated in 1972 in light of
the holding in Furman. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). McGautha's death sentence was
vacated by the California Supreme Court in light of an intervening case that declared that the current
state death penalty statute violated the California Constitution. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
99. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
100. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
101. The presumption of life may require that a new jury be impaneled for the sentencing phase
and/or that the prosecution be required to reintroduce all evidence of aggravating circumstances dur-
ing the sentencing phase. This Note does not, however, reach these issues, but is intended as only the
first step in the examination of the implications of the presumption of life. Further examination of
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tem, the Supreme Court reinforced this lenient attitude regarding the ad-
mission of aggravating evidence.1"' Nevertheless, nearly all state statutes
place on the prosecution the burden of proving the existence of any statu-
tory circumstances that it submits to the sentencing authority.1"3
Many states have neglected to assign the second and more fundamental
burden, that of persuading the sentencing authority that the defendant is
legally deserving of the death penalty.1 ' A few states, however, have in-
issues such as these should be undertaken by legislatures and courts in the future in an effort to give
full meaning to the presumption of life.
102. The Court has apparently adopted the position that proof of one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance adequately narrows the class of capital defendants to those who are eligible for the death
penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741-42 (1983). The Court also approved the trial court's
consideration of aggravating factors not enumerated in the statute, as long as the underlying evidence
is admissible. Id. at 2747-48.
103. See generally Gillers, supra note 90, at 102-19 (indicating which state capital punishment
statutes place burden on state of proving existence of aggravating circumstances). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has described the burden: "Where it is doubtful whether a particular aggravating
circumstance should be submitted, the doubt should be resolved in favor of defendant." State v. Oliver,
302 N.C. 28, 61, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204 (1981).
The majority of states require that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
at least one of the aggravating factors listed in the statute. Evidence of further statutory aggravating
circumstances is presented by the state, usually bound by the rules of evidence concerning relevance.
The aggravating factors included in the Georgia statute that was upheld in Gregg are typical of those
in most statutes. The factors include: the murder being committed at the same time as another life-
endangering crime, a murder committed for the purpose of receiving money, a murder of a judicial
officer or of a peace officer, a murder committed in an especially vile manner, and a murder commit-
ted for the purpose of avoiding arrest. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
The defendant can present any factors in mitigation and generally is not bound by the rules of
evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Mitigating factors
can be "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
104. The determination of guilt in a criminal trial has been characterized as a factual finding by
the jury that is distinguishable from the "normative, policy decision" involved in the capital sentencing
determination. This distinction has been used to argue that a burden of "proof" is therefore applicable
in the first instance, but not in the latter. Ford v. Stricldand, 696 F.2d 804, 831 n.17 (11th Cir.)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) & 845 n.2 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983). But see id. 696 F.2d at 877-83 (Anderson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that courts can and should apply concept of
burden of proof to the weighing process in capital sentencing decisions because its practical function is
to set forth degree of confidence decisionmaker should have in his or her conclusion). In Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting), Justice Powell asserted that an "objective truth" underlies the question of guilt or inno-
cence, whereas sentencing is the meting out of just deserts, and therefore any question of whether
procedures in capital sentencing are similar to- trial procedures is inappropriate. This reasoning ig-
nores the fact that the trial jury makes judgments on nonfactual issues as well as the distinctions
between capital and noncapital sentencing. In Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2755 (1983) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in judgment), Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish the jury's determination
of guilt from its decision to impose death by the fact that the sentencing jury does not decide "whether
particular elements have been proved." Most state statutes, including Georgia's, do however, place a
burden of proof of aggravating circumstances on the prosecution, see supra notes 102 and 103, and
some states give instructions on weighing them.
The determination of guilt is not, however, an issue of pure fact, but rather one requiring the
decisionmaker to make a finding of moral culpability, see supra note 61. Likewise, the capital sentenc-
ing authority first determines the purely factual issues of the existence of aggravating and/or mitigat-
ing circumstances, and then makes a finding of whether the defendant is morally deserving of the
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cluded a provision in their capital punishment statutes assigning a burden
of persuasion to the prosecution, 05 and some state courts have adopted
such a requirement.106 The Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged
the appropriateness of using standardized jury instructions to assign a
burden of persuasion in death sentencing to the prosecution.1
0 7
The practical import of the allocation of burdens of production and per-
suasion is that the judge must instruct the jury not only as to who bears
the burdens, but also as to what the burdens mean and how they can be
met. Courts and legislatures that have attempted to define the burdens
have been fairly consistent in discerning three specific issues. A useful
example is the Arkansas state statute that provides in part:
(1) The jury shall impose a sentence of death if it unanimously re-
turns written findings that:
(a) aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(b) aggravating circumstances outweight [outweigh] beyond a rea-
sonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 0
death penalty. In both the decisions on guilt and on death, the prosecution cannot prove its charge but
can only prove the underlying facts and then convince the decisionmaker of the moral appropriateness
of the decision. In Utah, one of the states that does place a burden of persuasion on the prosecution
during the sentencing phase of capital trials, the state supreme court has emphasized that:
[the] standard has to do with the degree of persuasion or certitude on the part of the sentencing
authority about the decision to sentence to death. It does not affect or change standards relating
to the burden of proof of facts borne by the prosecution at either the guilt or the penalty phase
of the trial.
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1983).
105. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (1)(c) (1977).
106. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (Utah
Supreme Court concluded that sentencing authority must be "'persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt
that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and [they] must further be persuaded, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty isjustified and appropriate in the circum-
stances."') (emphasis added).
107. In its interpretation of the Missouri statute and the Missouri Approved Criminal Instruc-
tions, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it is appropriate to compel "the jury to
determine whether the prosecution has 'proved its case' in a capital sentencing proceeding. Bulling-
ton v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444 (1981); see also Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984). One
member of the Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged that a capital sentencing authority must
be persuaded of more than the following facts: (1) that an aggravating factor exists, (2) that the
aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty, and (3) that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Justice Stevens observed that "a
jury might answer [these] questions affirmatively and yet feel that a comparison of the totality of the
aggravating factors with the totality of mitigating factors leaves it in doubt as to the proper penalty.
But the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliability in the
determination that 'death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."' Smith v. North Carolina,
459 U.S. 1056, 1056-57 (1982) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting denial of certiorari) (quoting in part
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)); see also Ford v. Strickland, 696
F.2d 804, 879 n.7 (11th Cir.) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
both statutory provisions and case law in various states concerning burdens applied in their capital
sentencing systems), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983).
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (1977) (bracketed word inserted by compiler of official code).
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A constitutionally precise statute would also, at a minimum, limit the
jury's consideration to aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and
require the jury to be persuaded that the death penalty was appropriate,
in the circumstances of the particular case, beyond a reasonable doubt.10 9
The weight of the burden of persuasion assigned to the state can make
an important difference in many criminal cases.11 We need not and
should not, however, derive the standard of persuasion for capital sentenc-
ing from the Eighth Amendment. 1 Instead, a capital sentencing system
that accepts the presumption of life as a core component of due process
can draw support for requiring the prosecution to bear the burden of per-
suasion beyond a reasonable doubt from the analogous due process impli-
cations of the presumption of innocence in criminal trials.1 2
The suggestions set forth here are intended not to be exhaustive but only illustrative of the due process
safeguards arising out of the presumption of life.
109. See Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting denial of
certiorari). Justice Stevens recognized the importance of such a requirement in his reference to the
Wood standard, supra note 106, which contains such a provision, to cure a defect in North Carolina
jury instructions similar to the problem in the Arkansas statute. Justice Marshall has relied on this
standard to argue that both the Maryland capital sentencing system, Stebbing v. Maryland, 105 S. Ct.
276, 279-80 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and the Pennsylvania system,
Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 105 S. Ct. 370, 371-72 (1984) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari), are constitutionally infirm.
110. In the seminal case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970), which held that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was the constitutionally required standard of persuasion in criminal trials,
the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that there was only a tenuous difference between standards.
The Court noted that the trial judge below had applied a preponderance of the evidence standard and
made a "finding of guilt that he conceded he might not have made under the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." The significance of the choice of standard was highlighted in State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71 (Utah), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982), where the defendant was sentenced to death under
the preponderance standard, but, according to the trial judge, would not have been sentenced to death
under the reasonable-doubt standard. The Supreme Court of Utah, in vacating the sentence of death
based on a mere preponderance of the evidence, rejected "the proposition that the death penalty may
be imposed when there is substantial doubt whether it should be." Id. at 80.
111. Arguments that "'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' should be the required standard of proof
at all stages of the death penalty proceeding" because the values of the Eighth Amendment require it,
may be compelling, but are constitutionally misplaced. See Note, supra note 35, at 338-42 (advocating
that reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required under Eighth Amendment at all stages of death
penalty proceeding). Such arguments simply perpetuate the selective application of specific due pro-
cess guarantees through the Eighth Amendment.
112. The argument that the Constitution requires that the appropriateness of the death penalty be
established beyond a reasonable doubt has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, Harris v. Pulley, 692
F.2d 1189, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument because court was "not aware of any in-
stance where the state must carry such a burden of proof when attempting to convince a sentencing
authority," and because if Supreme Court intended it, "it would have said so"), but the argument has
not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874 n.4
(1984) (grant of certiorari did not extend to this issue); see also Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 85
n.2 (Utah 1983) (reasonable-doubt standard of persuasion required under statutory construction but
not necessarily constitutionally compelled); Amsterdam, Anthony Amsterdam Analyzes New Mexico
Death Penalty Statute, I DEATH PENALTY REP. 1, 2 (1980) (judgment of death sentence is "precise
analogue" to conviction of guilt and therefore due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt);
Weisberg, supra note 28, at 342 n.160 (suggesting that arguments for reasonable-doubt standard may
be made under either Fifth or Eighth Amendment).
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The due process rationale that the Court used in In Re Winship,1 ' to
establish the requirement of the reasonable-doubt standard in criminal tri-
als, is equally valid for capital sentencing. The Supreme Court stated in
Winship that "[it is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt."1 4  The
Court reasoned that "[t]he standard provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence,"11 5 and that "the reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching
a subjective state of certitude .. ' .""" Justice Harlan, reasoning that
society views the conviction of an innocent person as far worse than the
acquittal of a guilty person, concurred that the reasonable-doubt standard
was required.
1 17
A reasonable-doubt standard for capital sentencing would impress upon
the sentencer the degree of certitude necessary to impose the death penalty
on an individual. Given the Supreme Court's practice of imposing higher
standards of proof where the chance of error is high, 1 ' a system fraught
with as much possibility for error as capital sentencing" 9 demands, at a
minimum, a standard offering the highest degree of certitude.12° The ir-
revocability and finality of the decision also compel such a standard in
light of the Court's practice of requiring a higher degree of certainty with
increasingly important interests.1 "1 The execution of an undeserving indi-
vidual would be far worse than imprisoning for life one for whom death
could be judged appropriate.1 22 Therefore, the reasonable-doubt standard
of persuasion should be placed on the prosecution in capital sentencing
proceedings.
113. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
114. Id. at 364.
115. Id. at 363.
116. Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1
FAM. L.Q. 1, 26 (1967)).
117. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-66 (1982) (magnified risk of erroneous factfinding at
parental rights termination proceeding); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (risk of reli-
ance on isolated instances of unusual conduct in civil commitment proceeding).
119. See C. BLACK, supra note 64.
120. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 879-81 (11th Cir.) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that court of appeals should follow reasoning of Addington and impose
reasonable-doubt standard in death penalty cases), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983).
121. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) (holding that Winship applied in
determining the severity of sentence because potential difference in restrictions of personal liberty is of
great importance). The Court points out that applying the same standard of persuasion throughout
the proceeding prevents the state from evading the effect by redefining the crimes. Id. at 698.
122. This value has long been part of the common law tradition. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
8, *358 ("IT]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."). If the Court continues to believe that it is better that a guilty person go free than that an
innocent person suffer, how can it not agree that it is better that one who deserves death should live,
than that one who deserves life should die?
The Yale Law Journal
C. New Procedural Mechanisms
New procedural mechanisms must be introduced in capital sentencing
proceedings analogous to those imposed on the prosecution in criminal
trials, to force the state to meet its burdens of production and persua-
sion. 12  First, before presenting any evidence of mitigating circumstances
at the penalty phase, or if no mitigating evidence is going to be presented,
prior to arguments to the jury, the defendant should be able to submit a
motion for a directed sentence of life on the basis that the prosecution has
submitted insufficient evidence of the existence of statutory aggravating
circumstances to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
deserving of the death penalty. 124 The court should determine whether
any rational sentencing authority could have determined the existence of
the minimal requirements of the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 26 If
the motion is granted, and a verdict of life imprisonment is entered, the
verdict should be final. The double jeopardy concerns that preclude ap-
peal or retrial of an acquittal 26 are equally valid here. Second, if the
court denies the motion for a directed sentence, the defendant should be
able to present evidence in mitigation and/or present a final argument to
the jury. If, after arguments by both parties, a verdict of death is issued,
the defendant should be able to submit a motion for a life sentence not-
withstanding the sentence of death, arguing that the sentence should be set
aside as contrary to the evidence.1
The automatic appellate review to state supreme courts that currently is
required in all capital punishment statutes 2 ' should be extended from the
123. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 59, § 8, at 53-56 (discussing mecha-
nisms in traditional criminal trials by which defense can force prosecution to put forth evidence and
discussing role of judge in this process).
124. Cf id. § 8, at 44 (judge must grant motion for directed verdict of acquittal "if evidence is
such that reasonable [jurors] must necessarily have a reasonable doubt"); see also Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (critical inquiry on review of sufficiency of evidence to support criminal
conviction is "to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt").
125. Cf Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See supra pp. 369-70 for discussion of
proposed minimal requirements.
126. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (where trial judge or appellate court finds
evidence insufficient to sustain guilt, judgment of acquittal entered and retrial for same offense pro-
hibited); see also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981) (double jeopardy prohibited prose-
cution from seeking death penalty at retrial, where they had sought and failed to get it at first trial
and defendant was implicitly acquitted of death penalty); Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2310
(1984) (same); cf KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COM-
MENTS AND QUESTIONS 456 n.a (1984 Supp. to 5th ed.) (distinguishing Bullinglon v. Missouri from
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), where government was allowed to seek harsher
sentence on appeal in noncapital case).
127. Cf. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 59, § 8, at 55 (judge applies sufficiency of evidence
test in ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding verdict after close of case).
128. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876 (1984).
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limited review described in Gregg29 to a review of whether the evidence
supports the determination of the existence of the minimal requirements
of the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. A finding of evidence insuffi-
cient to support the sentence by the appellate court would operate as an
acquittal, imposing a life sentence and barring resentencing.1 30 Introduc-
ing this traditional judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence for
death sentences in capital cases, as well as for convictions, will make ap-
pellate review more meaningful."'
CONCLUSION
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an indi-
vidual's interest in life as well as in liberty and property. Just as we pre-
sume that a defendant in a criminal trial is innocent, so must we presume
that a defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding deserves a life sen-
tence. The Supreme Court should abandon its Eighth Amendment proce-
dural analysis of capital sentencing, recognize a presumption of life based
on the values of the due process clause as the constitutional starting point,
and determine what, if any, procedural safeguards are adequate to ensure
that the extraordinary sanction of death is not imposed in an unconstitu-
tional manner.
-Beth S. Brinkmann
129. Appellate review under the statute in Gregg, which most state statutes followed, provides for
a three-part review to determine if: (1) the sentence was imposed under influence of passion or
prejudice; (2) the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance; and (3) the sentence is
disproportionate to sentences in similar cases in the state. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 212 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in judgment). But see Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984) (propor-
tionality review not necessarily an element of meaningful appellate review upon which Gregg was
based).
130. Cf Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10, 16 (1978).
131. See Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97 (1979) (exam-
ining major flaws of current appellate review and detailing failure of Georgia, Florida, and Texas
appellate review processes to achieve uniformity or objective standards).
